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The limits of ideological globalization. Current patterns of "left
and right" in different geographical regions
Abstract
Political thinking in terms of "left and "right" has successfully expanded from its originating Western
European context all over the globe. In all included world regions except the Middle East, at least 60
percent of the total population are ready to place themselves on a respective LR-scale. In all regions,
left-right self identifications are particularly widespread among the more educated and politically active
strata. However, very significant regional divergences cannot be explained neither by different
micro-characteristics on the level of respondents nor with the degree of macroeconomic development.
Thus, they are likely to emerge from differences in endogenous political culture. In conformity with
previous, studies, it was found that issue positions are better in predicting LR values on the left half of
the scale, while differences between moderate and extreme rightist positions cannot be grasped well
with the indicators at hand. However, this regularity is not valid in East Asia where the right scale
section is more highly associated with specific political stances. Highly educated strata show more
interregional variance in their degree of ideology than population with less schooling. This result
evidently contradicts the widespread theoretical notion that educated strata are more likely to adopt a
homogeneous Westernized culture all over the world.
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1. The Left-Right Axis: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last 40 years, many empirical studies have shown that there is one major ideologi-
cal dimension along which political life is organized in a wide range of different countries 
(Castles and Mair 1984; Gross and Sigelman 1984; Janda 1980; Laver & Budge 1993; 
Warwick 1992). A wealth of empirical evidence shows that the left-right axis is almost ubiqui-
tously salient in two ways: as a polarity that structures bipolar political conflicts and as a con-
tinuum that allows differentiated comparisons on an ordinal or interval scale. Thus, most 
citizens in most developed democratic countries are willing and able to place themselves on 
the left-right dimension: a scale usually ranging from 1-10 or from 0-10. (Inglehart and 
Klingemann 1987; Colomer and Escatel 2003: 3). Similarly, voters as well as political elites 
use the LR scale for characterizing social movements, political parties, candidates, news 
media, issue positions, political programs and governing regimes. 
 
“The left-right dimension has been found to be the most common one across developed de-
mocratic countries. The organizing role of the left-right aggregative or synthetic dimension 
facilitates basic exchanges between voters and party leaders.” (Colomer and Escatel 
2003:3). 
 
The left-right scheme has been called the "political Esperanto of our times" (Laponce 1981) 
and its relevance for comparative evaluations is sufficiently manifested in the fact that LR 
judgments have a significant impact on political behaviour: e. g. voting decisions or support 
given to political parties (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993; Ev-
ans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996). 
 
“Studies of electoral behavior have shown that individuals’ left-right self placement is a major 
predictor of their voting choices, and that its importance has been increasing in many coun-
tries over recent decades.” (Franklin et al. 1992; Gunther and Montero 2001). 
 
However, the basic character as well as the intra- and international diffusion of the left-right 
scheme is the result of dynamic historical processes shaped by political, cultural and socio-
economic as well as educational and stratificational factors.  
 
Given the accelerating changes in political culture following the rise of "New Social Move-
ments" as well as the neoliberal turns on economic policy and the end of the Cold War, there 
is much need for more detailed research concerning current changes and divergences re-
lated to 
 
1) the degree to which the LR scheme is established within different nations and geographic 
regions; 
2) the unequal distribution of LR-thinking among different population segments within na-
tions; 
3) the evolving semantics of "left" and "right" through time and space, and the changing as-
sociations between LR placements and political issue positions. 
 
Using data from the most recent World Values Surveys (1994-2004), this article will give 
priority to the first of these questions, but relate it to the remaining two - by analyzing the 
current divergences in the usage patterns and meanings of the categories called "left" and 
right" between various countries and regions. 
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1.2 Inhomogeneities and asynchronicities of international diffusion  
 
It is well known that the political left-right dimension has originated in France at the time be-
fore the revolution, some weeks after the convention of the Estates General in June 1789 
(Laponce 1981: 47). 
As an intuitive variable derived from the seat order in parliament, it filled the vacuum created 
by the vanishment of estate membership as a dominant criterion of classification. Like the 
top-bottom model of social stratification, the LR scheme is a simple spatial metaphor that 
has the characteristic of being translatable in all languages and being potentially adopted by 
all human cultures (Laponce 1981: 27). 
During the 19th century, the LR pattern spread to the rest of continental Europe, especially 
driven by socialist parties who loaded the terms with elaborated ideological content (La-
ponce 1981: 54). 
 
In European countries, left-right thinking is a stable feature of political processes since many 
decades. By comparing studies from the late sixties with the recent data from World value 
survey, it can be shown that the percentage of respondents ready to place themselves on 
the 1-10 scale has remained stable at about 75-90 percent. A conspicuous exception is 
Switzerland were the exclusion of women from voting rights (until 1971) caused earlier rates 
(in the total population) to be below 60% (Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976). 
Outside Europe, however, the left-right dimension is less established even in democratic 
countries, because it interplays with other classification schemes established in domestic 
political culture. In the United States and Japan for instance, the reigning polarity is still "lib-
eral vs. conservative"; but it has been increasingly overlaid and reshaped by left-right con-
siderations (Laponce 1981: 56). As Nie and Anderson have demonstrated in a longitudinal 
study, the general American public became “ideologized” in the years between 1964 and 
1972, when different individual attitudes of liberalism and conservatism became more tightly 
intercorrelated. (Nie and Anderson 1972; LeBlan and Merrin 1977). Left-right classifications 
became increasingly salient at least since the rise of the "New left Movements" and espe-
cially since the 1972 elections, where Nixon and McGovern represented for the first time 
quite neatly the two ideological poles (Inglehart 1989: 367). Characteristically, it was found 
that the rising tendency to identify political positions in left-right terms was expanding mainly 
within elites, while the general population remained largely unaffected. In 1980, about ninety 
percent of highly educated American respondents were found to grasp the meaning of left 
and right, while among less educated citizens, this share was lower than 30% (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990). 
 
Many comparative studies and much impressionistic evidence have shown that the salience 
of LR-thinking extends widely beyond the sphere of Western democracies, but that it is of 
significantly lower importance in less developed and less democratic nations. 
In a broad study including political experts of 42 countries, Huber and Inglehart (1995) found 
that left and right were basically used to define the political sphere in all countries except 
one. However, “the dimension was most salient in the 22 advanced countries, where more 
than 85% per cent of the experts used the terms left and right to define the major poles of 
political party conflicts, (compared to 70 per cent in the remaining 20 nations).” (Huber and 
Inglehart 1995). 
Finlay et. al. have
 
analyzed the meaning of the concept of left and right in both developed 
and developing countries. They concluded that  “...the stability and meaningfulness of the 
concept of Left-Right political orientation are to a large extent a function of the level of de-
velopment of the country." (Finley et al. 1974). 
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Given the fact that these findings are based on samples of university students (who repre-
sent everywhere a rather Westernized segment), it might be guessed that even larger differ-
ences would be found in comparisons between integral national populations. 
As Zechmeister argues, the salience of LR scales in underdeveloped countries is often re-
duced by the strong emphasis on “valence issues” that focus on ultimate ends rather than 
political strategies:  
"Valence issues are about ends, rather than the means indicated by a policy stance. Cam-
paigns in Mexico and other young democracies often focus significantly on issues such as 
ending corruption, reducing poverty, ensuring social justice, etc. While these issues do not fit 
obviously on a left-right dimension, extant literature suggests that parties or other political 
groups can claim ownership of such issues. Thus, if the left or the right in a country succeed 
in establishing ownership of a valence issue, by convincing citizens that their side is most 
capable of 'handling' that issue, then individuals in that society are likely to associate that 
priority to that ideological label.” (Zechmeister 2005). 
 
In many poorer countries, ideological divisions are additionally diminished by the overriding 
need of governments to conform to the standards set by extra- and supernational actors (like 
the US, EU, World Bank or IMF) (Krastev 2002). 
 
Similarly, ideological polarization can also be reduced by an overriding focus on the fight 
against corruption: 
“In addition to political instability, the perceptions of widely spread corruption in a society, 
and especially of political corruption, has the effect of clouding the public’s understanding of 
what it would take to tackle other national priorities such as a country’s bankrupt educational 
system, malfunctioning hospitals, or stagnating economy. As a result, public's obsession 
with one dominant topic, which cannot be simplified more, or approximated in terms of left 
and right, could be another factor that discourages public and politicians to structure their 
communication by using left-right dimension.” (Badescu and Sum 2005). 
 
However, other findings suggest that apart from economic development, the usage of LR 
patterns is strongly conditioned by socio-structural, political, institutional and cultural factors. 
In his comparative study on Algeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa, Rivera has found 
that also in Africa, high percentages of elites as well as of the general population place 
themselves readily on a LR-scale – except in the Algeria, where only the elite resulted to be 
ideologically sensitized, while the share of self-placers among the general population was 
less than 50% (Rivero 2004). 
In fact, Islamic Maghreb and Middle East countries seem particularly deviant from the West-
ern pattern for three reasons: 
- the need for the LR scheme is reduced because these countries rank on the lowest level of 
democracy and party competition; 
- politics is still heavily shaped by tribalistic and religious cleavages which tend to cross-cut 
ideological left-right divisions; 
- fundamentalist Islamic movements are particularly "hybrid" phenomena because they 
combine typically leftist positions (opposition against US domination and Western capitalism) 
with repressive moral attitudes and discriminatory orientations characteristic for the far right. 
 
Such hypotheses are corroborated ex negativo in the case of Turkey which combines rather 
high democracy and low Islamism with pronounced party cleavages in terms of left and right. 
 
The Middle East also demonstrates that the international diffusion of LS-thinking is not an 
irreversible process, but that it can turn backwards as well. Thus, 
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"In 1976 President Sadat introduced a hint of political pluralism by allowing the ASU to Split 
into competing "forums" representing the left, right and centre, which later became separate 
political parties. This experiment was short-lived." (Economist 1988). 
 
Similarly, Palestinian politics was shaped heavily by left right considerations in the 1970ies, 
while the current clash between Hamas and Fatah cannot be modelled in such terms. 
To the degree that political parties are allowed, however, there are at least niches where 
Western LR polarizations can be maintained:  
 
"While the fundamentalists remain the single most popular political force in general, there is 
still a presence for leftist and nationalist parties in those countries where parties are allowed. 
Furthermore, Green parties or environmental associations have now been formed and legal-
ised in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon" (As' Ad Abukhalil 1997) . 
 
In Latin America, the relevance of the left-right dimension has traditionally been neglected by 
many political scholars because it has been supposed that political parties are not strongly 
committed on the ideological level, but rather leaning toward populist, personalistic and cli-
entelistic orientations (Colomer and Escatel 2003: 3). Calculations based on data from Lati-
nobarometer annual surveys from 1995 to 2002 suggest that many Latin American voters 
tend to maintain pronounced ideological views and locate themselves rather consistently on 
the left-right dimension, but that they at the same time express high levels of political alien-
ation regarding the party system. Highest percentages of self raters were found in Uruguay 
(92%) and Brazil (85%), while lowest proportions were observed in Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Bolivia and Argentina (between 71 and 76 percent) (Colomer and Escatel 2003: 
4). 
Latin American countries also stand out by astonishingly low correlations between readiness 
for left-right-placement and the level of interest in political matters. 
On the one hand, there are many self-placers who are very alienated from the existing party 
system; on the other hand, we find highly politicized people who don’t identify with the LR-
dimension, because they maintain an opportunistic (“clientelistic”) relationship to political 
parties (Colomer and Escatel 2003: 6). As a second reason, it may be argued that in authori-
tarian regimes without free parties, the LR-dimension is not needed as a guide for political 
orientation, so that no correlations between scale placements and issue positions exists. 
(Colomer and Escatel 2003: 6). 
 
Even more complicated conditions are found in the former communist countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR.  
First of all, they have just recently been exposed to Western influences and may still be in 
the process of adopting basic democratic values and ideological orientations. Thus, Badescu 
and Sum (2005) have shown that in postsocialist countries, only 55% percent of respon-
dents were able to place themselves (as well as the three major domestic parties) on the LR 
scale - compared with 73% in established Western democracies. The same authors also 
found that Romanians were more likely to place themselves when they were frequently trav-
elling abroad. Evidently, travelling increases their chances of getting into contact with West-
ern political culture (Badescu and Sum 2005). However, major differences have to be ex-
pected between middle European countries (like Czech republic, Hungary or Poland) which 
have come under socialist rule after WW II, and the Ex USSR countries which - often lacking 
any endogenous democratic tradition - experienced more than 70 years of Bolshevik rule. 
Thus, the first category of countries was generally quicker to establish Western type party 
systems, to denationalize their economies and to qualify for full membership in the EU. Un-
surprisingly, Badescu and Sum have found much higher self placement percentages in 
Czechia, Hungary and Poland then in Russia and Belarus (with less then 30%) (Badescu 
and Sum 2005). 
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Secondly, the particular history of these countries has resulted in paradox semantic rever-
sals of the two ideological poles. In a way, the most leftist (ex communist) parties are "con-
servative" or even "reactionary" insofar as they still cling to values or institutions stemming 
from the earlier societal system; and the liberals and conservatives are most "revolutionary" 
insofar as they aim at a radical transformation according to western standards (Ev-
ans/Whitefield 1998).  
As Pippa Norris remarks: 
"... the traditional ‘conservative’ appeal of maintaining familiar social values and a nostalgic 
return to the past has often been most strongly associated with orthodox Communist parties 
or their successor movements on the left which have not reconstructed themselves into so-
cial democratic organizations. The most suitable equivalent to the ‘radical right’ in Western 
Europe is probably the more extreme ultranationalist parties, which have established a pres-
ence although often achieving marginal electoral success in most countries in the region." 
(Norris 2004, chapter 3). 
 
Third, the adoption of the LR scheme could also be slowed by the fact that successful re-
forms demand a national interparty consensus, so that divisive ideological elements have 
less weight. More generally, oligarchic tendencies of decision making may have the effect of 
reducing public deliberation and political participation, so that less socialization into ideologi-
cal value systems occurs and there is less need to use the LR scale for political orientation 
(Badescu and Sum 2005).  
 
By comparing data from 1996-01 and 2001-2005, Badescu and Sum conclude that  
"Data show no tendency of convergence between East and West in using and consistency 
of use of the left-right concepts. On the contrary, whereas in the West reliance on the left-
right one dimensional representation of the political parties has known a slight increase, in 
the East the proportion of people able to place in order main parties on a left-right scale, as 
well as proportion of people showing consistency between ideological distance and party 
preference, has decreased. (Badescu and Sum 2005). 
 
While many intersocietal differences in the salience of left-right thinking may be caused by 
historical, institutional and cultural factors, some of them may be more rigorously explained 
by theoretical propositions that refer to the functional needs for left-right scales in various 
political systems. 
In shortest term, this functionalist theory states that the salience of the LR continuum is 
highest under conditions of high political complexity and low political information.  
As a starting premise, the theory assumes that most people spend little efforts for acquiring 
and synthesizing political information, because they have no skills to do that or no available 
time. However, under conditions of political democracy, all citizens are called to make deci-
sions despite the fact that most of them are unable or unwilling to collect much detailed in-
formation on the political sphere. Given these conditions, they have a great need for simpli-
fying stereotypes helping them to decide which parties, leaders or political programs they 
should support. 
“In a political context, the left-right dimension represents a typical form of social cognition: 
When people reflect on politics, they tag themselves and others (people, groups, institutions, 
etc.) as ‘left’ or ‘right’. Acting on this understanding, they usually vote for parties and candi-
dates they perceive as being close to their own left-right placement and also usually take 
policy views in line with their left-right position.” (Kroh 2005.) 
 
Especially when political conditions are highly complex and non-transparent, citizens tend to 
rely on rather simple heuristic shortcuts in order to gain orientation and to come to non-
ambiguous voting decisions with a minimum of personal efforts (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Neuman 1986; Popkin 1994; Hinich and 
Munger 1994). Such labels facilitate also political communication, because they create a 
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common background of meaning that can be presupposed ex ante, so that it has not to be 
created on every single occasion.  
"In modern politics and mass media-dominated political communication, it is usually as-
sumed that, by using a simplified, encompassing ideological dimension, party leaders and 
candidates can transmit useful information on policy programs which can be understood by 
voters without paying high costs. It has, thus, been postulated that a party position on the 
left-right dimension can synthesize a number of party policy positions on many issues 
(Downs 1957) – an intuition that has repeatedly been submitted to scrutiny and empirically 
tested" (Colomer/Escatel 2004) 
 
In a general sense, the salience of the left-right dimension can be minimal in political sys-
tems with a low number of highly consolidated political parties: because party preferences 
can easily be built up without referring to ideological notions. In more complex and competi-
tive party systems, however, many voters will feel a need to locate themselves on the left-
right scale in order to identify the parties and candidates most akin to his own views (Ingle-
hart/Hochstein 1972; Inglehart/Klingemann 1976; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Knutsen 1998). 
 
This regularity certainly explains why the new dimension was established more rapidly in 
France than in bipartisan Anglo-Saxon countries: 
"Because England and the United States already possessed a two-party system and had 
experience very few changes in the names of their two parties, they had a lesser need than 
France for an overarching duality that could be used to describe party coalitions and splinter 
groups at a given time as well as over a period of history. France's unstable multiparty sys-
tem contributed to the entrenchment of the LR terminology (Laponce 1981: 54). 
 
Similarly, the theory explains why LR thinking is less pronounced in authoritarian systems (e. 
g. in the Middle East): because when opportunities for exerting political choices are lacking, 
there is little demand for decision-supporting cognitive schemes. 
 
The need for simplifying LR labels may be most pronounced in new democracies character-
ized by an non-transparent manifold of not yet clearly profiled personalities, programs and 
political parties: 
”In young democracies citizens face perhaps the most confusing of political environments: 
competitive elections, and the issues, parties, and candidates that compete in them, may be 
relatively new and are often still in flux. With respect to decision-making purposes, useful 
heuristic aids are particularly important in such contexts.” (Zechmeister 2005:1). 
 
On the other hand, however, these same needs for orientations are less likely to be fulfilled, 
because  
“…in young democracies, where the components of democratic politics are relatively new 
and often in flux, the meanings of ideological labels are likely to be less developed and 
evolving (Zechmeister 2005: 4). 
 
Thus, it may well be that citizens in ex socialist countries experience a desperate need for 
one-dimensional ideological self-placements in order to generate clear preferences among a 
manifold of parties and candidates, but that these same chaotic conditions are an obstacle 
for the emergence of such consolidated schemes. 
 
 
1.3 Inhomogeneities within national populations 
 
It is a trivial notion that the salience as well as the semantic contents of the left-right dimen-
sion are evoked and transmitted in processes of political communication.  
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Following Inglehart, we may say that political communication is the most basic sociological 
substrate from which all political processes draw their energy and direction. As many studies 
since Almond and Verba (1963) have shown, political communication tends to rise with the 
country's GNP per capita as well as with the individual level of education, while differences 
between men and women tend to decline (Inglehart 1989: 326ff.) 
 
Many theoretical arguments and at least some empirical findings support the hypothesis that 
politically sophisticated individuals are better able to make use of political labels like “left” 
and “right” because they are better informed about their meaning (Sniderman et.al. 1991; 
Kitschelt/Hellemans 1990; Klingeman 1979 etc.). Thus, Badescu and Sum have found that 
people who reported to participate in votings were more likely to place themselves on the 
LR-scale (Badescu and Sum 2005). 
 
In the early sixties already, Converse has observed that highly educated and politically inter-
ested individuals were more inclined to think in ideological terms (Converse 1964), and vari-
ous studies have shown that issue positions and left-right self placements are more tightly 
correlated when the level of political cognition is high (e. g. Inglehart/Klingemann 1976). 
This level of political cognition has been shown to be critically dependent on political inter-
ests and activities on the one hand and the educational level on the other (Ingle-
hart/Klingemann 1976). 
 
“In short, the greater the sophistication of an individual, the better her capacity for capturing 
meanings most commonly assigned to left-right labels by that society, that is for sharing the 
dominant conception of left-right-terms. Second, assuming that it requires greater cognitive 
capacity to understand and link policy stances, as opposed to symbolic components, to left-
right semantics, we should expect that, the more sophisticated the individual, the more she 
should define ideological terms along policy lines and vice versa for the less sophisticated.” 
(Zechmeister 2005:11). 
 
However, this of course presupposes that there exists a relatively consensual, culturally an-
chored conception of “left” and “right” in the given national society: so that it is just a ques-
tion of cognitive capacity whether it is perceived adequately or not. 
Nie and Andersen
 
have found consistency and intercorrelation among elites’ responses on a 
wide range of issues concerning the scope of government activity enabling them to identify 
clear “liberals” and “conservatives.”  On the level of uneducated strata, however, “there is 
little or no interdependence … in mass attitudes, because mass publics have neither the 
educational background, the contextual knowledge nor the capacity to deal with abstract 
concepts that sustain an organized set of beliefs over a wide range of political issues” (Nie 
and Anderson 1974). 
Given the high causal relevance of political interest and political communication, it is to be 
expected that political elites are most likely to maintain tight relationships between left-right 
self placements and issue positions. In fact, Eurobarometer studies have shown that within a 
sample of political candidates, the statistical variance explained was four times as high than 
within a sample of ordinary voters (Inglehart 1989: 368). Similarly, Lambert et. al. have found 
in a large Canadian sample that respondents with low education were least able to connect 
left-right self placements with specific political attitudes and issue positions (Lambert et., al. 
1986). 
In countries which have only recently been affected by left-right ideologies or in which the 
diffusion process is still going on, we may expect that the elites act as pioneers and opinion 
leaders: so that larger elite-non-elite differentials in the usage of left-right patterns should be 
found than in countries where this same thinking is established since very long. 
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This hypothesis is corroborated by Rivero’s comparative study on four African countries 
where it was found that the predictive power of political and economic attitudes on LR self-
placement was much higher among elites than among the general population (Rivero 2004).  
However, all these considerations cannot explain why left-right self placement is also widely 
common among people who lack any interest and practical involvement in political matters, 
so that they attach more affective than cognitive meaning to these two terms. 
This rather emotional content has been found among many Canadian voters who are less 
socialized than European citizens to use the LR dichotomy in the political realm: 
“Even when they were unable to define the concepts verbally, a significant portion of the 
sample could nonetheless use the terms and express feelings toward them. Taken together, 
these findings point to some of the ways in which left and right labels function to connect 
voters to the party system. At a minimum, they provide cues to distinguish good parties from 
bad parties and "us" from "them." (Lambert et. al. 1986) 
 
 
1.4 The divergent and changing meanings of left and right  
 
The astonishing permanency of the spatial left-right metaphor contrasts sharply with extreme 
variations of the meanings associated with these two terms during history and across differ-
ent cultures. 
Whoever identifies leftism with socialism should well remember that in the beginning 19th 
century, it was mainly associated with individualism, free enterprise, national independence 
and - following Rousseau - an endeavour to restore a more perfect form of human society as 
it had presumably existed in the past (Laponce 1981: 118ff.).  
Between about 1850 and 1960, leftism was almost exclusively amalgamated to socialist and 
communist ideologies associated with the various labour movements - thus giving priority to 
questions of economic organization, class relations and social welfare. Given the long dura-
tion of this phase, several scholars have tried to identify the “invariant core” of substantive 
values and political issues that define difference between left and right.  
While S M. Lipset (1954) defined leftism as the fight for more equality, Downs has tied it 
down to governmental economic interventions (Downs 1957).  
More recently, Knutsen has suggested a similar approach by counterpositioning a “leftist 
materialism” and a “rightist materialism” that differ in the role they give to free market forces 
vs. governmental controls. (Knutsen 1995). In conformity with such formulations, Euro-
barometer studies have found that leftist self placements are associated with support for 
more equality and more efforts for implementing human rights, for reducing poverty and ac-
tive fight against all kinds of racism in society. (Falter and Schumann 1992: 201). 
 
A comprehensive attempt to identity the transnational semantics of left-right ideologies was 
made by Laver and Budge on the level of Paneuropean manifesto data. Applying factor 
analysis, they have extracted 26 items defining leftist and rightist party positions.  
On the left side, the list includes issues like governmental control of capitalism, nationaliza-
tion of enterprises, internationalism and the expansion of social services, while rightist par-
ties were consistently characterized by an emphasis on traditional morality, law and order, 
free enterprise and national autonomy (Laver and Budge 1993). 
 
During the Cold War, most - developed and underdeveloped - countries were highly affected 
by exogenous determinants of LR divisions. “Leftism” was essentially connected with politi-
cal forces supporting the communism and the UDSSR, while “rightism” was a label given to 
explicitly “anticommunist” movements, personalities and political parties. Thus, the studies 
based on Eurobarometer 30 (1988) could show that in many European countries, rightism 
was strongly correlated with proudness of nationality as well as with nearness to fascist 
movements. (Falter and Schumann 1992: 200) 
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However, such findings are not providing the whole picture, because they neglect the ab-
sorption of feminist, pacifist and ecological values into the canon of leftist values – as a re-
sult of the “New Social movements" of the late sixties and seventies which brought a shift 
from materialist to postmaterialist orientations (Inglehart 1984). 
This change can become manifested in pronounced discrepancies between age cohorts. In 
the late eighties, it was found that older generations were still anchoring their left-right views 
in classical economic problems, while younger cohorts related it to "postmaterialist" (e. g,. 
ecological, feminist or pacifist) dimensions (Inglehart 1989: 372).  
Subsequently, the end of the Cold War has caused the solidified international system of left-
ist ideology to erode: replacing it with that a manifold of leftisms deeply shaped by national 
and regional cultures. As Lagos remarks,  
"...there are many lefts in Latin America, there is Michelle Bachelet´s left, there isLula´s left, 
Castro´s left, Chavez´s left, Morales´s left. (Lagos 2006). 
 
Evidently, the LR-dimension has an astounding capacity to absorb new political values, is-
sues and strategic goals (e. g. of social movements) (Mair 1997: 26; Inglehart 1984; Knutsen 
1995). However, these new aspects seem to complement and overlay the old ones without 
replacing them. 
 
Research has also made evident that the meanings of left and right vary between societies 
as well as between different individuals within the same society. Thus it has been shown by 
open-ended survey questions that individuals in a given society associate quite different 
meanings to the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ (e.g. Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983, 225-247; Fuchs 
and Klingemann 1990).  
Between nations, even more profound differences can be detected. Thus, Rivero has found 
that in South Africa as well as in Algeria, rightist elites are more inclined to fight for more 
equality and support strong governmental intervention when they define themselves as more 
rightest than when their self-placement is on the left (Rivero 2004). In Canada, it has been 
found that LR identifications are focusing completely on economic issues, while moral and 
religious positions do not correlate (Lambert et. al. 1986: 561). 
 
There is also empirical support for the hypothesis that postmaterialist values are not related 
to leftism in underdeveloped countries. The results of Rivero African study, for instance, 
show that neither abortion nor environmental issues are of any significance in countries like 
Uganda, Zimbabwe and Algeria – not even on the elite levels. (Rivero 2004). Only in the 
case of South Africa (the wealthiest of the compared nations) a modest impact of environ-
mental values on left-right self placement can be found. 
 
Less developed countries also show rather remarkable cleavages between elites and mass 
publics: e. g. in the case of Uganda where the elites tend to see the LR dimensions in terms 
of economic issues, while the masses associate it with aspects of the political order (Rivero 
2004). 
Contrasting with post-materialist trends in developed Western countries, Zechmeister has 
found that in Mexico, the meaning of “left” was increasingly shifting toward economic issues 
between 2001 and 2004 (Zechmeister 2005: 18). Interestingly, party elites were giving much 
more weight and sympathy to the term “left” than “right”, while “rightism” was more popular 
than leftism among the lower social strata (Zechmeister 2005: 10ff.). “Rightism”, on the other 
hand, seems to be more frequently used for characterizing political parties than political pro-
grams or issue stances (Zechmeister 2005: 12). 
 
As a general rule, the meaning of left-right polarities seems to be profoundly determined by 
the social and cultural cleavages predominant within a specific national society. In several 
East Asian countries, for instance, the weakness of class divisions implies that ideological 
conflicts focus mainly on questions of international relations and the domestic political order: 
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"As in the Middle East, few Asian countries followed Western European cleavage patterns. 
Although Japan comes closest to the Western European model, its relatively prominent left-
right divide ‘had more to do with foreign policy and defense’ than with class issues, and up-
heavals in Japanese party politics in the mid-1990s led ‘the demise of left-right ideological 
politics in Japan’ (Weisberg 2001, 90). In Korea and Taiwan, politics experienced even 
weaker socio-economic divides and tended instead toward democracy-related and nation-
related issue divide." (Deegen-Krause 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, the search for transcultural and transhistorical invariants doesn't seem totally 
futile, because at least one generalization may be tentatively made: Under most conditions, 
there seems to be a positive relationship between rightism and religiosity, while leftism goes 
along with distance - ore even open enmity - toward established religious beliefs, practices 
and organizations.  
In all twelve countries covered by the Eurobarometer 30, rightism was found to be associ-
ated with religious participation and subjective religiosity, while leftist and green parties were 
preferably chosen by people who declared themselves to be areligious and who didn’t be-
long to any religious confession (Falter and Schumann 1992: 205). 
This conforms well with the earlier finding of Inglehart and Klingemann that leftism was much 
more pronounced among nonreligious strata than among members of catholic or protestant 
churches. In addition, frequent churchgoers showed more rightism than more passive ad-
herents in both confessions (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). 
The argument that secularization trends may wipe away such correlation doesn't seem war-
ranted, As Inglehart argues, religiosity is one among the subjective factors gaining in impor-
tance when class and party identifications decline. Its impact on left-right identifications has 
may have increased recently because many left-right issues are no longer dealing with eco-
nomic questions, but with moral issues (e. g. abortion or immigration) which are heavily 
shaped ethical and religious views (Inglehart 1989: 381). 
 
 
1.5 Variable relationships between LR placements and political issue 
positions 
 
Individual self-placements on the left-right scale can be the result of two fundamentally op-
posed processes. 
 
1) Attitudes toward specific political issues are synthesized to a "super issue" on an ideo-
logical level (Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976). By inductive generalization, an individuals con-
clude that they are "far left" when they favour redistribution of wealth, open immigration and 
the nationalization of key industries, or "far right" when they combine proudness of national-
ity with a demand for degressive taxes and a conservative attitudes toward abortion. Such 
inductive generalizations have of course to be based on adequate cognitions about what is 
considered to be left or right in the domestic national society and political order. Evidently, 
such knowledge will be more sophisticated when somebody is highly interested in politics 
and engages in frequent political communication. Apart from that, higher education may help 
to become aware of such cultural patterns because it goes along with more extensive read-
ing and larger contact networks with other people who are adequately informed. 
 
2) Individuals have ties with particular parties which are known to occupy specific positions 
on the left-right dimension. By logical deduction, they tend to transfer the party’s position to 
themselves: 
"One may prefer a given party because of family tradition or religious and other affiliation. 
One is also aware of the conventional label attached to one's party. For decades, the mass 
media have spoken of the communists as a party of the extreme left, the Socialists as the 
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moderate left and so on. Knowing this, the voter locates himself on the left-right scale at 
about the same location as the party he prefers (Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976: 228).  
 
In this latter case, there will of course be a more reduced relationship between LR place-
ment and individual attitudes on political issues. Arian and Shamirargue argue that left and 
right are cues provided fully by political parties. According to their view,  
“there is no ideological thinking or conceptualization, and nothing that can be called a super 
issue, or ideology, for a large portion of the public,… and no stability over time in the public’s 
position on issues”, so that the left-right continuum is just denoting a party space, not an 
ideological space, for the electorate.” (Arian/Shamir 1983) 
 
In classical industrial societies as they have existed until the 1960ies, there was a strong 
predominance of social and organizational factors: rightism and leftism was primarily defined 
by the belongingness to societal population segments and formalized institutions. Since the 
seventies, however, these structural determinants characteristic of “old politics” have de-
clined in importance: giving way to a “new politics” where ideological left-right standings are 
much more determined by individual values and preferences. (Inglehart 1984: 32; 1991: 
279–85; Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 496). 
 
The general decline of class voting has not at all contributed to a decline of such ideological 
factors. To the contrary, it has caused voting behaviour to be more determined by subjective 
attitudes, among which ideological concepts of leftism and rightism are of paramount impor-
tance (Knutsen 1988; Kim/Fording 1998; Freire 2006: 367 ). As a consequence, individual 
traits and skills become more important in shaping ideological attitudes. For instance, the 
correlations between LR-self-placements and political attitudes may be highly conditioned by 
individual education and individual political exposure: because individuals have to learn the 
exact meanings of left and right in their respective society, and they have to synthesize dif-
ferent values and issue positions in order to get an overall value on the one-dimensional LR 
scale. As Inglehart and Klingemann have found out already in the seventies, individuals with 
higher education are better able to work out their left-right position in accordance with their 
issues positions, so that institutional influences (stemming from religious adherence or politi-
cal partisanship) decline (Inglehart/Klingemann 1976). 
 
In many non-western countries, "deductive" left-right self-placements are still the rule insofar 
as party membership is based more on regionalist and tribalist identifications, or clientelism 
than on ideological affinities.  South Korean parties, for instance, were found to be 
 
“…personality dominated, clientelistic parties, built on the basis of vast networks of patron-
client relations and informally institutionalized intra-party factions.” (Croissant 2002). 
 
Some researchers dealing with the semantics associated with the LR scale have also indi-
cated that basic asymmetries exist between the two poles. Thus, it has been found that 
postmaterialist values are strong predictors of left placement, while opinions on materialist 
are more determinative for rightist positions (Potter 2001). 
 
In several other empirical studies, it was found that rather tight correlations between issue 
positions and left-right self ratings exist for the left half of the continuum, while on the right 
side, the explanatory power of political attitudes is much reduced. As Laponce concludes 
from a meta-analysis of such studies, this is true for most issues conventionally related to 
the LR-continuum: e.g. attitudes toward economic regulation, nationalism or gender equality 
(Laponce 1981: 158ff.). As the author himself has verified in a study on local parties in Swit-
zerland, the same is also true for items related to financial policy, immigration policy or envi-
ronmental protection (Geser 1992). 
Such "heteroscedasticities" seem to mirror the more fundamental difference concerning the 
dimensionality of leftist and rightist ideological systems. When somebody confesses to be a 
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leftist, this statement implies a lot of information because it can be deduced that he or she 
favors redistribution of wealth and income, the implementation of affirmative action, the re-
duction of military expenses, the liberalization of immigration, the abandoning of nuclear 
energy and more aggressive measures against climate change. While these issues are not 
intrinsically connected, attitudes about them tend to cluster rigidly (e. g. in the sense that 
there are almost no conservative greens, anti-green feminists or pacifists on the far right).  
On the other hand, defining somebody as a "rightist" is not so informative, because such a 
label can refer to at least three rather independent meanings: nationalism, economic con-
servatism or strict religious morality. While this asymmetry can easily be verified in Western 
countries (even on the basis of qualitative methods), it is of course speculative whether it 
does similarly apply to other world regions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
The following empirical analysis is based on the World values Surveys in 62 countries that 
have been conducted in the period 1994-2004. Generally, the survey tries to provide a pic-
ture of the national populations aged 18 or older. In many cases, however, complicated 
stratified procedures instead of straightforward representative sampling methods for various 
reasons: e. g. because of national concerns with minority regions (Serbia, Switzerland) or 
because rural populations could not effectively be reached (Venezuela). As a consequence, 
it cannot be assumed that the sample provides a 1:1 proxy of the entire national population. 
 
2.1 The left-right scale 
 
In all of the WV surveys, respondents were asked to place themselves on an ideological left-
right scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). This measurement corre-
sponds with the Eurobarometer scale (introduced in 1976), but deviates from many other 
questionnaires (e. g. the European Social Survey) where an alternative eleven point scale 
(0-10) is used. As well known, the 0-10 point scale has come under attack because it was 
hypothesized that whenever a midpoint (5) is offered, it will not only be chosen by respon-
dents with a truly centrist stance, but also by all those who want to hide that they don’t know 
where to place themselves (Inglehart and Klingemann 1987; Schumann and Presser 1981, 
162). In fact, Deutsch et al. have demonstrated midpoints are particularly used by respon-
dents who rank low on political interest (Deutsch et. al. 1966). 
Theoretically at least, the WVS avoids these problems by using a scale that forces all re-
spondents to “take sides”. However, the same problem seems to persist, as it is found that 
the value 5 is chosen much more frequently than 6 – maybe because many respondents 
falsely thought that 5 is the midpoint of the scale.  
On a general level, the practicability of Left-Right scales is rather uncontested, because 
when compared with most other political scales, they have been consistently found to be 
highly valid and reliable (usually above .75) (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Kroh 2005:8). 
 
2.2. The semantic constituents of “left” and “right” 
 
Following the rich international literature on semantic meanings associated with political left-
ism and rightism, a sample of nine variables were selected which seem to grasp a wide 
range of (materialist as well as post-materialist issues usually connected with this political 
polarity. Unfortunately, the choice was narrowed by the fact that some rather central aspects 
have not been tapped in the questionnaires of some important countries. 
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1) Attitude toward Equality 
"Incomes should be made more equal" vs. "We need larger income differentials as incen-
tives" (ten point scale). 
 
2) Attitude toward economic Ownership 
"Private Ownership of Business should be increased" vs. "Government ownership of busi-
ness should be increased” (ten point scale). 
 
3) Attitude toward self-responsibility 
"People should take more responsibility" vs. "Government should take more responsibility" 
(ten-point scale) 
 
4) Approval/disapproval for discrimination of foreigners 
"When jobs are scarce, should nationals be preferred?" (three-point scale) 
 
5) Attitude toward environmental protection 
"Would you be ready to pay higher taxes for preventing environmental pollution?" (four-point 
scale) 
 
6) Feelings of Patriotism 
"Are you proud of your nationality?" (four-point scale) 
 
7) Attitude toward traditional gender roles 
"Being a housewife is just as fulfilling s being a working woman." (four-point scale). 
 
8) Approval/disapproval of abortion 
"Do you find abortion justifiable?" (ten-point scale) 
 
9) Religiosity 
"How often do you attend religious services?" (eight point scale). 
 
2.3 The independent variables 
 
Apart from gender and age, the following potential predictors of left-right thinking have been 
included: 
 
1) Level of national wealth and development: quantified by the Gross Domestic Product per 
capita. 
 
2) Individual Education: operationalized as the "highest educational level ever attained" 
(eight point scale) (“low”= primary; “middle”=secondary; “high”=tertiary). 
 
3) Income level: decile rankings. 
 
3) Rurality vs. urbanity: measured by the population size of the city, town or village where 
the respondent lives (eight point scale). 
 
4) Level of Political interest: measured by the "degree to which politics is important in life" 
(four point scale) and the frequency a respondent engage in political discussions with friends 
(three-point scale). 
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2.4 Regions and countries 
 
While every single country would deserve its individual treatment based on its idiosyncratic 
political history, culture and institutions, available research results (reported above) provide 
enough reasons for grouping them into categories based on their belongingness to particular 
cultural regions. 
While the criteria of classification are certainly questionable for various reasons, we have 
decided to form the following eight divisions: 
 
1) Anglo-Saxon countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, United King-
dom, United States. 
 
2) Western European countries speaking Germanic languages: Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. 
 
3) Western European countries speaking Romanic languages: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 
 
4) Post socialist Eastern European countries; Albania, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. 
 
5) Ex USSR countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.  
 
6) Islamic countries in the Maghreb and the Middle East: Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, 
Pakistan 
 
7) East Asian countries: Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam 
 
8) Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Rep. El Salva-
dor, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela 
 
European countries like Ireland, Finland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Malta and 
Greece were excluded because they either belong to both or to other linguistic groups; the 
few African countries outside the Maghreb has been left out because they seem not suffi-
cient to represent the "black continent"; and India and Bangla Desh have been eliminated 
because they could not be included in any of the selected regions. 
 
2.5 Weights 
 
In order to draw descriptive statistical inferences to regional populations as a whole, it is 
crucial to take the unequal size of national populations and national samples into account. 
Thus, cases have been weighted by a factor resulting from dividing population size with 
sample size, so that a respondent gets the value 1.0 when he represents 10 000 people, 
and a value of 10.0 when he is a proxy for 100 000 individuals. 
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3. Empirical results 
3.1. Prevalence of LR self-placements 
 
Among all the missing answers in the scale question, we tried to identify all cases in which 
the question was factually asked, but was either answered by "don't know" or not answered 
at all. It can be argued that in such cases, respondents were aware that a self-placement on 
the LR scale was demanded, but either unwilling or unable to follow these instructions. This 
implies that the sample may also include an unknown number of respondents who maintain 
a well-defined scale position subjectively, but who refused to communicate it to the inter-
viewer. Nevertheless, we think that most refusals are caused by cognitive factors: by igno-
rance about the meaning of left and right or by personal insecurity and/or indecisiveness 
about one's own political position.  
 
As seen in Table 1, the lowest refusal rates are found in -Anglo-Saxon and Germanic conti-
nental European countries: closely followed by East Asian nations where the share of posi-
tive respondents also approximates 90%. Latin America, Romanic European countries and 
post-socialist nations in Eastern Europe constitute a second cluster: with response rate of 
about 80%. Significantly lower percentages are found in former member states of the Soviet 
Union, and by far the lowest values in Islamic countries of the Maghreb and the Middle East. 
 
Table 1: Percentages of respondents who were ready to place themselves on the LR scale: 
according to geographic region (cases weighted). 
 
Anglo 
Saxon 
Continent 
Europe 
Germanic 
Continent 
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex- 
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
89.4 89.3 79.2 77.8 60.7 32.9 88.2 82.0 
 
Within all regions, refusals of self-placement are most prevalent among respondents with 
lowest educational degrees, and across the regions, divergences shrink with increasing level 
of education (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Percentage of Respondents refusing to place themselves on the left-right scale: according  
to region and level of individual education (cases weighted).
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From this, we can tentatively conclude that a worldwide left-right culture exists into which 
educated classes from all regional cultures become socialized, while uneducated strata have 
remained more attached to autochthonous culture where this ideological dimension is less 
reliably established. This pattern is particularly evident in countries of the Middle East and 
former members of the USSR, where more than half of all less educated respondents ab-
stain from a self-placement. 
In all other regions, however, left-right ideology seems to be so pervasive that it has been 
effectively internalized even by the less educated (and politically less active) parts of the 
national populations.  
 
To an astonishing degree, East Asian and Latin American nations conform to the pattern 
found in Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries. Finally, Figure 1 confirms that a 
large gap exists between Ex USSR nations and post-socialist Eastern European countries 
which have successfully assimilated Western political culture (especially on medium and 
higher educational levels). 
The logistic regression results presented in Table 2 provide insight into the combined causal 
impact of individual and societal factors on the readiness for left right self-placements in the 
total world sample. 
 
Looking across these six multivariate models, the following major conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1) When the analysis is restricted to objective individual status characteristics, about ten 
percent of total variance (indicated by Nagelkerkes R-square) can be accounted for (Model 
I). Male gender and higher education stand out as the two most potent (mutually independ-
ent) predictors, while income level, urban background and age are of minor importance. 
 
2) Statistical explanation rises to about 17% when in addition to objective characteristics, 
subjective variables related to political interest are included (Model II). Evidently, self- 
placements are far more prevalent among respondents who are frequently involved in politi-
cal discussions and for whom politics is a central part of personal life. The impact of higher 
education and male gender seems to be partially mediated by the higher political involve-
ment of these groupings, because the coefficients of these two predictors are considerably 
lowered when political interest factors are controlled. 
 
3) Explanation power raises to 24% when in addition to all individual variables, the level of 
national development (Gross Domestic Product per Capita) is introduced into the model 
(Model III). Interestingly, this large effect is only seen when the logarithm of GDP (instead of 
the linear variable) is included. This conforms to the notion that the same absolute incre-
ments of GDP lose significance on higher development levels, because they affect wealth 
levels by much smaller percentages than when a country is rather poor. 
 
4) About the same share of total variance (23%) can be explained when just the regional 
dummy variables are considered (Model IV). Taking Germanic Western European nations as 
baseline, Anglo-Saxon countries share about the same level, while all other regions rank 
much lower (as already illustrated by Table 1). Interestingly, adding the GDP variable does 
not contribute anything to explanatory power (Model V). Thus, it might by hypothesized that 
the huge impact on GDP seen in Model III is just an artefact caused  cultural by the relative 
lower economic level of non European regions. 
 
5) However, this bold interpretation is only partially supported by Model VI in which all indi-
vidual and societal variables are included. This most inclusive equation is very powerful, 
because more than 40% of the whole variance is explained. As a major result, it can be seen 
that all predictors retain some independent explanatory power when all other predictors are 
statistically controlled. In particular, this is also true for the GDP variable which regains some 
of its significance it has lost when (Model V) no individual variables have been considered. 
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However, its contribution to the model is marginal because almost the same explanatory 
power (.409) is achieved when it is eliminated. Model VI also corroborates the significant 
causal impact of gender and urbanity because the respective coefficients are even higher 
when confounding societal variables are controlled. In addition, it shows that the higher non-
response rates in regions outside Western Europe are only marginally explained by lower 
levels of political interests –except in East Asia, where such variables are of highest impor-
tance. 
 
Table 2: Explanatory power of different predictors on the willingness of respondents to place 
themselves on the left-right scale (logistic regression equations; total World sample (cases 
weighted in proportion to the sample size and the population size of the country). 
 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Odd’s 
Ratio 
Odd's 
Ratio 
Odd's
Ratio 
Odd's 
Ratio 
Odd's 
Ratio 
Odd’s 
Ratio 
Constant .025*** .036*** .004*** 8.268*** 8.180*** .068*** 
Education 1.225*** 1.174*** 1.159*** -- -- 1.129*** 
Income level 1.099*** 1.080*** 1.092***  -- 1.017*** 
Age 1.012*** 1.009*** 1.004*** -- -- .996*** 
Gender (Male) 1.429*** 1.283*** 1.340*** -- -- 1.516*** 
Size of city 1.033*** 1.036*** 1.002 -- -- 1.098*** 
Importance of Politics in life -- 1.746*** 1.734*** -- -- 1.488*** 
Frequency of political talks -- 1.251*** 1.252*** -- -- 1.473*** 
GDP per capita (ln) -- -- 1.515*** -- 1.001 1.197*** 
Anglo-Saxon -- --  .985 .985 .868* 
Western Europe Germanic -- --  -- -- - 
Western Europe Romanic -- --  .464*** .464*** .655*** 
Ex-socialist Eastern Europe -- --  .408*** .408*** .657*** 
Ex-USSR -- --  .183*** .183*** .235*** 
Maghreb, Middle East -- --  .057*** .057*** .054*** 
East Asia -- --  .754*** .756*** 1.731*** 
Latin America -- --  .613*** .614*** .814*** 
Total Model 3.147 3.147 3.147 3.140*** 3.140*** 2.907*** 
Nagelkerkes R2 .097 .168 .241 .230 .230 .410 
(N =    ) 83402 83402 83402 126678 126678 83402 
 
*** p < .001   ** P < .01 
 
While the absolute levels of self placements are so different, these levels are determined 
everywhere by the same pervasive predictors (Table 3). In all regions, between 11 and 21 
percent of the statistical variance can be explained by taking into account seven individual 
characteristics, among which gender and the two political interest variables exert the strong-
est impacts, particularly in Anglo-Saxon, European and East Asian countries. The extremely 
pronounced gender impact in Northwestern European countries is particularly remarkable 
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because gender equality – in a social and cultural sense – is known to have reached higher 
levels there than in most other regions. 
 
By contrast, causal influences stemming from education and income status are rather mod-
est and –concerning the income variable – somewhat inconsistent. Controlling for education, 
high income strata in Middle East and East Asian regions are evidently less likely to think in 
LR terms than middle and lower classes. City size is most decisive in Middle Eastern coun-
tries, while its significance is almost nil in continental Europe and the Ex USSR. 
While LR self-placements occur more frequently with increasing age in Anglo-Saxon and 
European regions, the contrary is true in Ex USSR, Middle East and East Asian countries. 
This accords well with the hypothesis that left-right ideology has diffused rather recently into 
these geographical spaces, so that the younger cohorts (who tend to be more open toward 
all kinds of transnational influences) are more likely to be affected. 
 
Table 3: Explanatory power of different predictors on the willingness of respondents to place 
themselves on the left-right scale (logistic regression equations; total World sample; cases 
weighted). 
 
 
Odd's Ratios 
Anglo 
Saxon 
Western
Europe  
German 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Constant .175*** .111*** .133*** .133*** .128*** .016*** .961 .279 
Education (8) 1.112*** 1.204*** 1.086*** 1.086*** 1.131*** 1.167*** 1.035*** 1.141*** 
Income level (10) 1.057*** 1.154*** 1.119*** 1.040** 1.042*** .905*** .844*** 1.032** 
Age (6) 1.073*** 1.069** 1.011*** .979** .940*** .931*** .833*** 1.020 
Gender (Male) 1.526*** 1.796*** 1.383*** 1.646*** 1.575*** 1.228*** 1.787*** 1.297*** 
Size of city (8) 1.088*** 1.008 1.027** 1.035*** 1.035** 1.332*** 1.177*** 1.102*** 
Importance of 
politics in life (4) 1.534*** 1.589*** 1.684*** 1.424*** 1.333*** 1.325*** 2.010*** 1.353*** 
Frequency of po-
litical talks (3) 1.680*** 1.640*** 1.695*** 1.932*** 1.345*** 1.212*** 1.642*** 1.472*** 
Nagelkerkes R2 .111 .143 .144 .178 .115 .211 .193 .098 
(N=   ) 8073 10178 8226 25703 19886 6750 3956 14089 
 
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05  
 
As a summary, we may conclude that at the turn to the 21th century, political orientations 
organized on the axis of left-right ideology is not only rather ubiquitous in developed Western 
nations, but has diffused significantly into non-western spheres, particularly East Asian and 
Latin American countries. Despite decades of authoritarian rule, postsocialist Eastern Euro-
pean countries have extensively assimilated to Western European and Anglo-Saxon stan-
dards - possibly because they have internalized this culture already before Warsaw pact rule 
after World War II. By contrast, former USSR member states are still lagging behind – but 
considerably less than Islamic countries of North Africa and the Middle East where a major-
ity of the population is still unable or unwilling to express political opinions in such one-
dimensional ideological terms. On the level of societal determinants, it is evident that cultural 
factors associated with geographical regions are far more decisive than the level of eco-
nomic development, because the explanatory power of GDP per capita vanishes when re-
gional variables are controlled. 
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Within all regions, left-right self-placements are determined by the same set of individual 
status characteristics and attitudes, among which gender and political interest show the 
most pronounced and most consistent effects. While the significance of political interest 
seems trivial, the huge impact of gender deserves some additional comments. Evidently, 
males are much more likely than females to classify themselves on the left right polarity 
even when education, political interest (and other variables known to be correlated with gen-
der) are statistically controlled. This makes it hard to evade the conclusion left right thinking 
is primarily an ingredient of a masculine culture, while women may be more inclined to iden-
tify with more specific issues, without relating them to an overarching, simplifying ideological 
scale. 
 
  
3.2. Divergences in scale distributions and means 
 
As comparative international studies have shown, the responses to left-right scales do not 
necessarily follow the rules of a normal distribution. Arithmetic average, modes and medians 
may deviate from the theoretical midpoint, and distributions may be skewed to the left or the 
right. Given the lack of calibration procedures, it is questionable to what degree such pat-
terns mirror any corresponding biases on the level of specific political values and issue posi-
tions. However, they may still reflect social norms and expectations reigning in specific cul-
tural settings: e. g. the asymmetric antipathy for Rightists widely prevalent in European 
countries (as a fall out of National Socialism), or a general positive evaluation of centrist po-
sitions (as an expression of rational neutrality and peaceful moderation).  
 
As seen in Figure 2, the Anglo-Saxon and Latin American countries approach most closely 
the ideal of a normal distribution: with a broad focus on the middle values and rather low 
frequencies both on the extreme left and right. While rather similar conditions hold in Eastern 
Europe, the Ex-USSR member states and Middle Eastern countries, Western European 
populations deviate sharply by their skewness to the left and East Asian nations by their 
even more pronounced bias toward the right. Evidently, extreme leftism has its maximum in 
Southern Europe and rightism its global minimum in Northwestern European countries. 
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of respondents on the left-right scale: according to World regions
(only respondents with high political interest / communication)
Value on the left-right scale
 
Looking at the arithmetic scale means resulting from these frequency distributions, Figure 3 
shows that they vary significantly between different strata of the population. In Western 
Europe as well as in the Middle East, East Asia and Latin America, means shift to the left 
with rising level of education, while the reverse is true in Ex-USSR countries, and almost no 
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differences are found in Eastern Europe and the Anglo-Saxon sphere. Evidently, educated 
Europeans represent a particular leftist segment of global society, while uneducated East 
Asian populations tend to the opposite extreme. Eastern Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries 
most closely approach the midpoint (5.5) of the scale: contrasting with Western Europeans 
and Middle East populations who lean definitely to the left, and East Asian and Latin Ameri-
can nations whose respondents display a pronounced bias to the right. 
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Figure 3: Average values on the left-right scale: according to individual education (cases weighted)
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In the case of post-communist countries, the rightest leanings of educated strata may be 
explained by their particular abhorrence of former authoritarian regimes because of their 
conspicuous deficits in civil rights and intellectual freedom. 
 
And for explaining the astonishing convergence of Middle Eastern countries with Western 
Europe, we have to consider that the sample comprises only the thirty- something percent of 
respondents who have answered the scale question: a minority that may well be rather 
Westernized in political culture.  
 
 
3.3 LR placements and various political issue positions 
 
In order to assess the meaning given to leftist, centrist and rightist positions, it is useful to 
correlate scale-self-placement with the respondent’s positions on various political issues – 
attitudes that have been found empirically associated with this ideological dimension (see 
2.3). 
 
However, such an analysis has to taken into account three basic limitations. 
 
First of all, it cannot be expected that all respondents derive their scale position “inductively” 
from synthesizing their political opinions. As we have seen above, LR placements can also 
originate “deductively” by deriving one’s own position from the position attributed to an affili-
ated political party (see 2.4). 
 
Secondly, identifying the “leftist” or “rightist” connotation of political issue positions requires a 
cognitive capacity that is not likely to be accomplished by people who are very uneducated, 
structurally unable to acquire the relevant information or very disinterested in political mat-
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ters. Consequently, we hypothesize that if any national or regional differences in the mean-
ing of left and right exist, they will be most clearly expressed by respondents ranking high in 
political interest and political participation. 
For testing this assumption, we create an index of political interest by summing up the two 
variables that have already been found decisive whether any self placements are made or 
not: the scale measuring the “importance of politics in life” (1-4) and the variable capturing 
the frequency of involvement in political discussions (1.3). Respondents with the two highest 
index values (7 or 6) are ranked as “high”, those with values 5, 4, or 3 as “medium”, and 
those with 2 or 1 as “low”. When these three subsamples are analyzed according to the de-
gree to which left-right self placement is statistically explained by all the nine issue predictors 
(discussed in 3.3), we get the results presented in Figure 4. We see that within all eight 
world regions, respondents high on political interest have a much larger percentage of the 
total variance explained than those ranking medium or low. As a consequence, we decide to 
eliminate the politically disinterested populations from our sample and to continue the em-
pirical analyzes just with the 20969 respondents who reach index values of 6 or 7. 
Third, previous research results let us expect that considerable asymmetries between the 
left and the right part of the continuum exist (see .2.4) There, it is advisable to analyze the 
two sections of the scale separately. 
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Figure 4   : Combined explanatory power of nine individual attitudes on the self placement on the 
left-right scale (1-10): according  to region and level of political interest: (Corrected R2 of the 
linear regression equation * 100; cases weighted)
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1. Economic equality 
According S. M. Lipset's early definition, the major constitutive element of leftism is the fight 
for more economic equality (Lipset 1954). While such materialist/socialist demands have 
been supplemented by various post-materialist issues since the late sixties, they have re-
mained a basic ingredient of leftist policies, particularly in countries where the respective 
political parties are still tightly connected to labour unions, and the working class. On the 
rightist pole, the same issues have regained salience in the course of neoliberal ideologies 
which have reinforced positive attitudes toward inequality because it is seen as a natural 
correlate of free market structures and a driving force of economic growth. 
Thus, we are not surprised to find that attitudes toward income equalization are most consis-
tently associated with self-placements on the LR scale: even in regions of the Ex USSR and 
the Middle East where many other dimensions are uncorrelated (Table 4). In the whole 
Western hemisphere (including Latin America), however, such attitudes are more far better 
apt to separate leftists from centrists than centrists from adherents of the political right. In 
Eastern Europe and East Asia, correlations are about the same in both scale sections, while 
in the Middle East, equality issues are evidently more salient for differentiating centrists from 
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rights. In the former member states of the Soviet Union, correlations within both sections are 
zero: an indication that attitudes toward equality or only (weakly) associated with a simple 
dichotomous understanding of "left" vs. "right". 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations between disapproval/approval of more income equality and self-
placement on the left-right scale, on the left-center scale and the center-right scale (only re-
spondents with high political interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
Europe 
German 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .318*** .326*** .288*** .195*** .077*** .071*** .165*** .127*** 
left-center (1-6) .247*** .254*** .231*** .073* .008 .029 .084*** .250*** 
center-right (5-10) .143*** .075 .163*** .093* .003 .104** .094*** .004 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that preferences for higher equality go along with more leftist scale positions. 
 
 
2. Business ownership 
Similar to equality issues, the question of private vs. public business ownership also belongs 
to the classical dimensions of socialist ideology. Until the end of the Cold War, it was espe-
cially salient in countries where leftist parties still maintained narrow ties to Marxist-
communist ideologies: e. g. in Italy and France. On the other hand, the issue has also re-
gained salience in the course of Thatcherism and other neoliberalist reforms that aimed at 
the privatization of hitherto governmental enterprises (e. g. in the public utility and telecom-
munication sector). 
As seen from Table 5, the privatization question resembles the equality issue in being a po-
tent predictor of leftism and rightism in several regions of the world. 
 
Table 5: Correlations between attitude toward private vs. governmental business ownership 
and self-placement on the left-right scale, the left-center scale and the center-right scale (only 
respondents with high political interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
Europe 
German 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .218*** .250*** .338*** .213*** .269*** .116*** .127*** .027* 
left-center (1-6) .177*** .183*** .202*** .162*** .192*** .025 .060** .077*** 
center-right (5-10) .089*** .181*** .203*** .047 .000 .068 .114*** .084*** 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that preferences for more governmental business ownership go along with more 
leftist scale positions. 
 
Considering the classical link to communist ideologies, we are not surprised to find the high-
est correlations in Southern European countries as well as in the Ex USSR. In all post so-
cialist countries, however, privatization seems exclusively a matter dividing leftists from all 
others: from centrists as well as from adherents of the extreme right. This contrasts with the 
Hans Geser: The limits of ideological globalization   http://socio.ch/internat/t_hgeser5.pdf 
 25
conditions in Western Europe where the issue is equally correlated within both scale sec-
tions, and the situation in East Asia and Latin America where questions of economic owner-
ship are somewhat more associated with divisions between center and right. 
 
3. Individual responsibility vs. governmental control 
While the first leftists (living at the time of the French revolution) were eager to preserve in-
dividual freedom against interferences by an authoritarian state, things have turned to the 
contrary since the later 19th century when leftist parties began to identify with socialist ide-
ologies and to catalyze the expansion of the welfare state which was seen as legitimated to 
curtail individual freedom in order to enhance the security and well-being of all. In the era of 
communism, leftists in Western countries were often discredited as advocates of authoritar-
ian governmental control, while later on, Neoliberalists have actively pursued strategies of 
deregulation and "de-welfarization" in order to ease tax burdens and to free private business 
from stifling governmental restrictions. However: important divergences within the Western 
hemisphere stand out: while on the European continent, the welfare states still enjoys high 
acceptance, it is more seen as a threatening leftist project in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
Table 6: Correlations between attitude toward more individual vs. more governmental respon-
sibility and self-placement on the left-right scale, the left-center scale and the center-right 
scale (only respondents with high political interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western 
European 
German 
Western
European 
Roman 
Eastern 
European 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .335*** .273*** .189*** .188*** .180*** .029 .219*** .091*** 
left-center (1-6) .302*** .162*** .108*** .141*** .112*** .036 .148** .076*** 
center-right (5-10) .173*** .156*** -.010 .056 .044 -.031 .141*** .044** 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that preferences for more governmental control (=less individual responsibility) 
go along with more leftist scale positions. 
 
Under these provisions, it is not surprising that this item stands out as a particularly strong 
predictor of leftism and rightism in the English speaking nations: especially as a separating 
factor between the left and the political center (Table 6). In post-socialist countries, the re-
sponsibility item is similar to the privatization issue in showing no correlation between center 
and right.  
The Middle East is the only region where the responsibility issue shows absolutely no corre-
lations with self placements on the LR scale. This finding is consistent with the notion that in 
Islamic countries, "individual responsibility" cannot be a relevant issue because it is not a 
genuine constituent of the reigning endogenous religion and culture. 
 
4. Ecologism 
As a result of the postmaterialist "New Social Movements" flourishing in the late sxities and 
the seventies of the 20th century, ecologism has become part of leftist ideologies in many 
countries. On the one hand, Western leftist parties have usually given high priority to ecolo-
gist goals, and on the other hand, "Green parties" usually go along with socialist parties also 
in many nonecologist issues: e. g. in social policy, immigration laws, gender rights or interna-
tionalism. 
However, it is evident that the diffusion of such ecologist values has occurred very unevenly: 
not only across continents, but even within the hemisphere of highly developed Western 
countries. Thus, "Green parties" of national significance or only found in some continental 
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European countries north of the Alps, while they have never gained momentum in Southern 
Europe and in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Unfortunately, the World value Surveys provide only rather unsatisfactory data for analyzing 
ecologist ideology in worldwide cross-national perspective. In the context of this study, one 
of the survey questions seemed viable despite the fact that it was not posed in Middle East 
countries: the question whether the respondent would be willing to pay higher taxes if this 
money would be spent for purposes of environmental protection. 
By inspecting Table 7, we must conclude that this is the most dissensual of all our left-right 
indicators, because the fully consistent positive correlations are only found in two regions: in 
Anglo-Saxon nations and continental European countries speaking Germanic languages.  
In southern Europe, a positive correlation appears only in the right scale section, and in all 
other regions, zero correlations or even negative relationships abound. The most spectacu-
lar inconsistency is found in East Asia where rightists give more support to ecologist taxes 
than adherents of the political center. In Western regions, exactly the opposite is the case: 
rightists are far less disposed than centrists to pay ecological taxes – while differences be-
tween centrists and leftists are less pronounced. 
 
Table 7: Correlations between unwillingness to pay more taxes for ecological purposes and 
self-placement on the left-right scale, the left-center scale and the center-right scale; (only 
respondents with high political interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
Europe 
German 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .295*** .167*** .109*** -.057* -.060* -- -.180*** -.033** 
left-center (1-6) .186*** .078*** -.058*** -.097** -.015 -- .019 .047* 
center-right (5-10) .284*** .161*** .153*** -.023 -.077* -- -.181** -.043* 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that willingness to pay ecological taxes goes along with more leftist scale posi-
tions. 
 
5. (Non)discrimination of foreigners on the job market 
International solidarity and the fight for antiracist nondiscriminatory standards have always 
been part of socialist leftism; but such issues have recently gained significance as a conse-
quence of increased transnational migration. Of course, their salience is low in poorer coun-
tries which are too unattractive to encourage any significant immigration; but in highly devel-
oped regions, they give rise to protectionist rightest movements eager to keep out foreigners 
from the job market (and the adjunct national welfare system). 
 
Thus, it is not astonishing that correlations between job protectionism and rightism are only 
found in highly developed Western regions (Table 8). In European nations with Roman lan-
guages, no other item is so powerful in predicting left-right placements (within both sections 
of the continuum). In Anglo-Saxon countries, by contrast, it's an issue exclusively relevant 
for separating leftists from citizen at the political center - like in East Asia, where the same 
correlations hold on a lower absolute level. In all other regions, job protectionism is unrelated 
or even inversely related to left-right ideology. In the Middle East and the former USSR, na-
tional protectionism tends to be most pronounced at the extreme left. 
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Table 8: Correlations between opinion that "jobs should be given to nationals in first priority" 
and self-placement on the left-right scale, the left-center scale and the center-right scale; (only 
respondents with high political interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
Europe 
German 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .186*** .233*** .377*** -.003 -.027 -.059** .056*** .012 
left-center (1-6) .204*** .167*** .194*** .006 -.070** -.075** .101*** .016 
center-right (5-10) .023 .141*** .219*** -.023 -.021 .063 .013 -.003 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that rejection of discriminatory job recruitment practices goes along with more 
leftist scale positions. 
 
6. Gender equality 
Since more than 30 years, Western leftism has been deeply shaped by feminist influences 
advocating gender equality on political levels as well as within all relevant societal spheres.  
One of the most consensual demands is that female emancipation has to go along with a full 
integration of women in the job market, because only paid work roles and professional ca-
reers provide a basis for economic and social independence - as well as for the acquisition 
of skills and higher societal prestige. As such values have become more widespread in soci-
ety, they have also been adopted by many nonleftist parties - and may now only be con-
tested by highly conservative groups on the right. 
This may explain why this item is in most regions more discriminative on the right section of 
the scale than between the center and the political left (Table 9). In Anglo-Saxon nations as 
well as in the Ex USSR and East Asia, a U-curve seems to hold: with lower support for tradi-
tional gender roles at the center than on the left side and to the right.  
 
Table 9: Correlations between the opinion that "being a housewife is as fulfilling as working" 
and self-placement on the left-right scale, the left-center scale and the center-right scale; (only 
respondents with high political interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western 
Europe 
German 
Western 
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .042*** .192*** .076** .036 -.025 -.001 .076*** .035** 
left-center (1-6) -.082*** .190*** -.008 .038 -.122*** -.027* .117*** .057** 
center-right (5-10) .078*** .080* .099* .023 .106** .016 .234*** .061*** 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that low evaluation of housewife roles goes along with more leftist scale posi-
tions. 
 
In fact, leftists in all regions except Germanic parts of continental Europe seem to be more 
disposed than centrists to subscribe to the traditional housewife model of female life. They 
seem to be still inspired by socialist women movements in the early 20th century which 
fought for the liberation of women from work (by increasing governmental support for fami-
lies): because work was conceived as evil capitalist exploitation (Weber 1906/1907). 
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7. Patriotism 
In the late 18th and early 19th century, leftism was "nationalist" in the sense of advocating the 
rights of territorial populations against the exploitation by transterritorial actors like royal dy-
nasties, feudal family clans or the church. The later socialist left, however, became interna-
tionalist by articulating the transterritorial solidarity of the working class and the basic rights 
of all human beings on this planet. Correlatively, it was the political right that was more and 
more opposing this trend by focussing on patriotism and nationalism – in some cases even 
of an openly racist nature. Thus, Western European studies usually find a significant positive 
relationship between rightism and support for nationalism (Falter and Schumann 1992: 200). 
However, different and more complicated patterns are found outside the Western hemi-
sphere: In the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact states of Eastern European countries, for 
instance, Stalinism was a movements that succeeded in "kidnapping" nationalism for pur-
poses of the extreme left; and in Islamic countries, fundamentalist movements that show all 
signs of extreme rightism (e. g. on the moral plane) go not along with nationalism, but with a 
religious identification that transcends all territorial borders. Thus, we are not surprised that 
the positive relationship between patriotism and rightism holds mainly for Western (and Latin 
American) countries, while lower, zero or even inverse correlations are found in post social-
ist regions and in the Middle East (Table 10).  
 
Table 10: Correlations between "proudness of nationality" and self-placement on the left-right 
scale, the left-center scale and the center-right scale; (only respondents with high political 
interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
Europe 
German 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
Am 
left-right (1-10) .267*** .320*** .216** .001 .068*** -.046* .216*** .187*** 
left-center (1-6) .256*** .232*** .148*** .005 .013 -.067** .080*** .078*** 
center-right (5-10) .080*** .129**** .079 .068 .097** -.006 .148*** .143*** 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A negative correlation signifies that low “proudness of nationality” goes along with more leftist scale positions. 
 
In the Middle East, the higher patriotism shown by leftists may be easily explained by the 
fact that they are less affected by Islamist ideologies which emphasize transnational reli-
gious identification; and the zero correlations in Eastern Europe may mirror transitory condi-
tions where right-wing patriotism is neutralized by remnants of a Stalinist nationalism which 
is amalgamated with extremely leftist ideological positions. 
 
8. Religiosity 
There is no straightforward relationship between religion and the left-right scale. On the one 
hand, the teachings of Jesus have given rise to reform or even revolutionary movements, as 
they have flourished particularly in Latin America, and Islam propagates egalitarian values 
that can be subversive to traditional authoritarianism and feudal societal orders.1 On the 
other hand, all major religion are the products of preindustrial societies and "conservative" in 
                                                 
1 Characteristically, an empirical study reported by Laponce shows that while the term “Godfather” is usually 
associated with rightism, “Jesus Christ” is more connected to the notion of centrism or even moderately leftist 
ideological stances (Laponce 1981). 
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the sense that they take part for traditional values and institutions. While catholics accept 
church teachings accumulated in twenty centuries, orthodox and protestant populations are 
taught to be submissive to any political order in which they find themselves embedded. From 
the very beginnings, therefore, to be "extremely leftist" meant to take distance toward 
churches: at the time of the French revolution as well as in the era of Marxist socialism 
which has been built on premises of materialistic atheism. While the rise of post-materialism 
has reduced class voting, it has not changed the empirical regularity that (at least in Euro-
pean countries), much less leftists are found among regular church goers than among peo-
ple not affiliated with any church (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Falter and Schumann 
1992). 
By inspecting Table 11, it becomes evident that religiosity (operationalized as participation at 
religious services) is a potent predictor of left-right self-placements in all eras of the world. 
East Asia stands out as the only region where a curvilinear relationship between LR values 
and religiosity exists. While leftists follow the worldwide pattern of being less religious than 
respondents at the center, religiosity declines sharply between the center and the extreme 
right – resulting in a positive correlation over the whole scale. 
 
Table 11: Correlations between frequency of participation at religious services and self-place-
ment on the left-right scale, the left-center scale and the center-right scale; (only respondents 
with high political interest; cases weighted). 
 
 Regions 
 Anglo Saxon 
West 
European 
Germanic 
Western
European 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Mid 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .237*** .263*** .336*** .220*** .136*** .085*** .133*** .077*** 
left-center (1-5) .118*** .251*** .269*** .232*** .061** .131** .075*** .013 
center-right (6-10) .095*** .007 .120** .030 .095** .041 .258*** .036* 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that lower religiosity goes along with more leftist scale positions. 
 
Not unexpectedly, negative relationships are weakest in areas known to be highly religious 
(Middle East and Latin America), while they are surprisingly strong in rather secularized 
countries of the Western hemisphere and post-socialist regions. 
In most cases, religiosity is a variable that mainly separates leftists from incumbents of cen-
trist positions, while its impact on rightism is lower (or even zero in the case of Germanic and 
Eastern European countries). However, the reverse holds in East Asia, where it is primarily 
the difference between centrists and rightists that is significantly based on religious factors. 
Similar conditions hold in the Ex USSR which deviates from post-socialist European coun-
tries by a rather weak impact of religiosity on leftist vs. centrist positions. 
 
9. Abortion 
From a leftist point of view, traditional religious morality is an obstacle for female self-
determination, because measures of birth control are discouraged and abortion of an unwel-
come foetus is usually strongly forbidden. 
In the more recent postmaterialist periods, such moral questions have become more salient: 
substituting classical issues related to economic organizations and class relations that have 
lost ground because the number of traditional working class voters has diminished (Inglehart 
1989) 
As seen from Table 12, the abortion issue is a potent predictor of leftism and/or rightism in 
all World regions, particularly in Romanic (=catholic) European countries and in the Anglo-
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Saxon sphere. Similar to the religiosity item, attitudes toward abortion primarily separate 
leftists from centrists, while differences between center and right are less affected. Out-
standing exceptions are the former member states of the USSR, where the issue is only 
discriminating between center from right. Again, they contrast to an astonishing degree with 
post-socialist Eastern Europe which conform much more to Western standards.  
 
Table 12: Correlations between disapproval for abortion and self-placement on the left-right 
scale, the left-center scale and the center-right scale; (only respondents with high political 
interest; cases weighted).1 
 
 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 Anglo Saxon 
West 
Europe 
Germanic 
Western
European 
Romani 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex-
USSR 
Mid 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
left-right (1-10) .346*** .261*** .386** .138*** -.012 .098*** .090*** .154*** 
left-center (1-6) .217*** .295*** .244*** .132*** .037 .053 .107*** .244*** 
center-right (5-10) .126*** .046**** .129** .068 .092** .029 .070*** .129** 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
1 A positive correlation signifies that approval for abortion goes along with more leftist scale positions. 
 
 
3.4 Issue combinations and clusterings 
3.4.1. Cumulative causal impact on LR self placements 
As was already shown in Figure 4, a large percentage of the variance in left-right self place-
ments can be statistically explained when all issues are included as predictors in a multivari-
ate regression. Looking at Table 13, it is evident that this determination is highest in Western 
Europe where all nine predictors (except religiosity in the case of countries of Germanic lan-
guages) provide a contribution.  Anglo-Saxon countries – where gender equality is evidently 
of no ideological significance - follow next. The rather high explanation level achieved in 
East Asia is mainly caused by the huge impact of nationalism (and shrinks very much when 
the “perverse” positive impact of religion is accounted for).  
Post communist European nations conform with Western Europe, except that nationalist and 
ecologist items are not associated and the relevance of religiosity is somewhat increased. 
Even weaker cumulative explanations are achieved in the former member states of the So-
viet Union and Latin America, and in the Middle East, only a single minor impact (caused by 
preferences more  equality) can be detected. 
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Table 13: Explanatory power of nine individual attitudes on left-right self placement: (only re-
spondents with high political interest; cases weighted). (BETA- Coefficients of the multivariate 
linear regression equations) 
 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
European 
German 
Western 
European 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex 
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Approval of income 
inequality .16*** .21* .12*** .15*** -- .11** .12*** .13*** 
Private vs. govern-
mental  business 
ownership 
.07*** .18** .22*** .16*** .24*** -- -.09***  
More individual vs 
governmental  re-
sponsibility 
.17*** .12*** .11*** .10** .12*** -- .14*** -- 
Unwillingness to pay 
taxes for ecological 
purposes 
.16*** .12** .06** -- -.05** -- -.10*** -- 
Job discrimination 
for foreigners  .04*** .09** .29*** -- -- -- .05*** -- 
Proudness of na-
tionality .13*** .22*** .07** -- .05** -- -.27*** -.17*** 
Being a housewife is  
as fulfilling as work-
ing 
-- .13*** .04** .07** -- -- - -- 
Participation at reli-
gious services .08*** -- .14*** .18*** .08*** -- -.23*** -- 
Disapproval of abor-
tion .19*** .16** .11*** .09** -- -- .05** .12*** 
Percentage of ex-
plained variance  
(corrected R-Square) 
.302 .347 .376 .131 .105 .001 .256 .068 
(N =   ) (1193) (978) (493) (2400) (2565) (608) (1247) (2089) 
 
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
 
3.4.2 Correlative interrelations and factorial structures 
In the section above, we have succeeded quite well in explaining left-right self-placements 
as the “inductive” result of several issue positions that make independent additive l contribu-
tions. This view does not preclude a second perspective that sees leftism and rightism as 
ideologies defined by rather stable and consensual configurations of political goals, opinions 
and beliefs. Under this second aspect, we are focussing on the horizontal relationships 
among issues and apply methods of factor analysis for testing to what degree these interre-
lations arrange themselves to dimensional structures that may be interpreted in terms of 
“left” and right”. 
 
As seen from Tables 15a and 15b, all regions except the Middle East are similar insofar as 
there is a first ideological factor that is highly associated with placements on the LR scale. In 
Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries, this first factor absorbs about 25% of the 
total variance and includes stances toward income equality, nationalism, religiosity and opin-
ions on abortion. Evidently, Southern European countries deviate from other Western na-
tions by associating left-right ideology more with job discrimination and less with classical 
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socialist items related to the role of government. In fact, they also from the non-western re-
gions where the issue of governmental control is of pervasive importance. 
In all non-western regions, the Left-Right factor is much less dominant, as it explains less 
than 17% of totals variance and is only associated with just four (or even less of the nine 
items.  Unsurprisingly, its lowest salience is found in the Middle East where it appears only 
as the third factor and is related to only two items: income equality on the one hand and 
abortion on the other. 
 
Table 15a: Factorial structures of left-right issues in Anglo-Saxon and European countries 
(only respondents with high political interest; cases weighted (Unrotated factor coefficients). 
 
 Anglo Saxon Western Europe Germanic 
Western Europe 
Roman Eastern Europe 
 I II III I II III I II III I II III 
Left-right placement .74 -.09 .05 .74 -.01 .10 .76 .09 -.12 .67 .20 -.08 
Approval of income 
inequality .48 -.34 .11 .48 -.53 .10 .45 .40 -.16 .52 -.10 .14 
Private vs. governmen-
tal business ownership 
 
.44 -.20 .45 .50 -.45 .11 .29 .66 .21 .60 -.37 -.07 
More individual vs 
governmental  respon-
sibility 
.58 -.29 .19 .51 -.60 .02 .29 .66 .20 .62 -.17 .25 
Unwillingness to pay 
taxes for ecological 
purposes 
.48 -.24 -.46 .23 .19 .65 .12 .21 -.56 -.24 .16 .47 
Job discrimination of 
foreigners  36 -.22 -.39 .37 .50 .42 .56 -.18 -.32 -.10 .24 .46 
Proudness of national-
ity -.45 -.03 -.39 -.48 -.32 -.03 -.44 .38 -.14 -.11 -.54 -.18 
Being a housewife is 
not as fulfilling as 
working 
.15 .41 .42 .34 .10 -.61 .21 -.09 .73 -.09 .20 -.72 
Participation at reli-
gious services -.49 -.64 .07 -.55 -.22 .34 -.60 .41 -.02 -.34 -.68 -.03 
Approval of abortion .61 .50 -.30 .54 .46 -.18 .70 -.28 .01 .21 .67 -.13 
Percentage of ex-
plained variance  25.1 12.0 10.3 24.3 14.9 11.8 25.4 13.5 11.8 16.8 15.6 11.0 
 
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
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Table 15b: Factorial structures of left-right issues in nonwestern regions (only respondents 
with high political interest; cases weighted (unrotated factor coefficients). 
 
 Ex-USSR Middle East East Asia Latin Americae 
 I II III I II III I II III I II III 
Left-right placement .63 .24 .13 -.21 -.28 .64 .65 -.03 .12 .52 .09 --.25 
Approval of income 
inequality .33 .11 -.57 .27 -53 .51 .45 .18 -.57 .29 -.65 -.15 
Private vs governmenta  
business ownership .72 -.04 .25 .71 -.08 .01 -.22 -.24 -.14 -.04 -46 .53 
More individual vs. 
governmental  respon-
sibility 
.63 -.18 .-16 .60 -.08 .32 .65 .01 -.16 .40 -64 -.08 
 
Unwillingness to pay 
taxes for ecological 
purposes 
-.12 -.19 -.68 .-- -- -- -.49 .17 -.22 -.31 .22 .07 
No job discrimination 
of foreigners  -.30 .21 .25 .25 -.68 .07 .17 -.34 .62 -20 -.09 .65 
Proudness of national-
ity -.04 -.50 .26 .30 -.40 -.03 -.56 .06 -.43 -.53 .18 .26 
Being a housewife is 
not as fulfilling as 
working 
.18 .43 .13 -.15 -.08 -.34 .11 -.70 .06 .29 -.13 -.24 
Participation at reli-
gious services -.19 -.57 .13 .30 .46 .20 .24 .04 -.28 -.52 .13 -.45 
Approval of abortion -.10 .63 .18 -.34 ..13 .48 .17 -.66 .04 .59 -.32 -.16 
Percentage of ex-
plained variance  16.1 13.4 10.9 15.1 13.7 12.8 18.0 15.3 10.5 16.3 12.6 11.4 
 
 
3.4.3. The highly variable intervening impact of education 
While the mere awareness of the left-right dimension has been found correlate highly with 
education in all world regions (see 3.1), it is expected that the relationships between issue 
positions and LR self placements are even more conditioned by levels of schooling. Two 
reasons may account for this., First of all, certain information levels are necessary in order to 
perceive adequately such connections as they are existing in the respective (national or re-
gional) political culture; and secondly, capacities of mental abstraction are a prerequisite for 
relating specific political issues to higher order values and ideological dimensions. As has 
been widely demonstrated in empirical studies, information levels as well as intellectual ca-
pabilities tend to be positively related to individual education. In addition, such a positive 
relationship mirrors the fact that LR- ideology is highly institutionalized in a society: insofar 
as it is most strongly articulated by elite strata that have the capacity to translate it into fac-
tual politics and to reinforce its societal dominance by various means (e. g. by controlling 
media or processes of socialization). 
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As seen in Tables 16a and 16b, these expectations are well borne out for Anglo-Saxon and 
Western European countries, while they fail to hold in all other regions. Only in the former 
three regions, higher education goes along with  
-  a much increased degree of “vertical” ideologization (seen in the high cumulative percent-
age of LR-variance explained by the nine issues). 
-  a considerably heightened degree of “horizontal” ideologization: manifested by the more 
dense interrelationships between issue positions as they are expressed by the higher “Ei-
genvalues” of the first extracted factors. 
 
Table 16a: Combined explanatory power of nine individual attitudes on left-right self place-
ment: according to level of education (only respondents with high political interest; cases 
weighted). (Corrected R-square of the multivariate linear regression equations) 
 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western 
Europe 
Germanic 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex 
USSR 
Middle 
East* 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Low Education .11 .26 .29 .15 .12 .04 .20 .06 
Medium Education .25 .36 .35 .09 .07 .08 .32 .11 
High education .48 .39 .46 .19 .18 .08 .23 .10 
 
 
Table: 16b: Percentage of total variance explained by the first factor (LR-factor)* extracted in 
an unrotated factor analysis: according to level of education (only respondents with high po-
litical interest; cases weighted). 
 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western 
Europe 
Germanic 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex 
USSR 
Middle 
East* 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Low Education 16.38 22.02 21.22 18.61 13.46 12.38 16.53 14.20 
Medium Education 22.36 22.50 24.83 16.20 15.65 15.53 16.09 16.70 
High education 31.27 28.09 29.73 17.87 17.01 14.12 14.03 19.95 
 
* In Middle East countries, the variable focussing on ecological taxes is lacking, because it was not part of the 
survey 
 
Neither in ex-communist countries nor in the Middle East, East Asia or Latin America, any 
such significant differences educational levels are found. This implies that lower educational 
strata are similar worldwide by sharing rather low levels of ideologization, while educational 
elites show much higher intercultural and intercontinental divergences: between most tight 
LR-adherence in Anglo-Saxon nations and Western European nations and much lower ideo-
logical consistency everywhere else. 
 
3.4.4. The low impact of gender 
In Table 2 (see 3.1), it was demonstrated that males are much more prone than females to 
place themselves on the left-right scale – an effect that remains very strong even if level of 
education, political interest and other possibly confounding variables are statistically con-
trolled. From, this we might conclude that women - maintaining more inner distance to the 
LR axis will also be less inclined to organize their issue positions in such one-dimensional 
ideological patterns.  
However, this hypothesis is not consistently borne out. Only in Anglo-Saxon and Southern 
European countries, males show a somewhat higher tendency to relate their opinions to 
their ideological placements as well as to cluster them on a single axis. In all other regions, 
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no significant gender-related differences are found. Evidently, the females included in our 
analysis represent a more selective sample than the male respondents because larger per-
centages of them have been eliminated due to lacking self placement or low political inter-
est. Those remaining, however, seem to conform with the same standards as males. 
 
Table 16a: Combined explanatory power of nine individual attitudes on left-right self place-
ment: according to gender (only respondents with high political interest; cases weighted). 
(Corrected R-square of the multivariate linear regression equations) 
 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
Europe 
Germanic 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex 
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Males .35 .29 .42 .14 .18 .04 .28 .09 
Females .26 .32 .31 .16 .06 .07 .25 .10 
 
 
Table: 16b: Percentage of total variance explained by the first factor (LR-factor)* extracted in 
an unrotated factor analysis: according to gender (only respondents with high political inter-
est; cases weighted). 
 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western 
Europe 
Germanic 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex 
USSR 
Middle 
East* 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Males 25.63 24.02 27.21 17.33 17.32 15.29 17.83 15.55 
Females 24.89 24.78 23.25 17.50 16.02 15.75 15.35 18.49 
 
* In Middle East countries, the variable focussing on ecological taxes is lacking, because it was not part of the 
survey 
 
3.4.5. Almost no age-related divergences 
While easy to measure, age-related differences are difficult to interpret because they may 
reflect divergences due to life cycle periods as well as changes between age cohorts and 
historical generations. In Table 2, it was found that the impact of age on self placement 
prevalence was extremely weakl, and in a similar fashion, Tables 17a and 17b demonstrate 
that almost no age-related differences in ideological patterns exist. A notable exception is 
found in Middle East countries where the oldest age cohort (over 50) show the strongest 
tendencies to relate issue positions to ideological scale positions and to cluster them on one 
dominant dimension.  
 
Table 17a: Combined explanatory power of nine individual attitudes on left-right self place-
ment: according to age (only respondents with high political interest; cases weighted). (Cor-
rected R-square of the multivariate linear regression equations) 
 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western
Europe 
Germanic 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex 
USSR 
Middle 
East 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Age: 15-29 .32 .35 .38 .03 .04 .04 .18 .10 
Age 30-49 .31 .37 .41 .12 .11 .05 .28 .10 
Age: 50+ .30 .33 .37 .18 .11 .23 .31 .16 
 
 
This finding corroborates the hypothesis that in Islamic countries, left-righ thinking has been 
quite peronounced in the 60ies and 70ies of the last century, while today, it has given way to 
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endogenenous Islamic values that deviates moresharply with Western culture (see 1.2). In 
all other regions, the findings provide no basis for assuming any intergenerational change. 
Particularly, there is no evidence that younger cohorts in postsocialist countries are more 
ready to adopt Western ideological culture than their parents that have been influenced by 
alternative communist doctrines. 
 
Table: 17b: Percentage of total variance explained by the first factor (LR-factor)* extracted in 
an unrotated factor analysis: according to age (only respondents with high political interest; 
cases weighted). 
 
 Anglo Saxon 
Western 
Europe 
Germanic 
Western
Europe 
Roman 
Eastern 
Europe 
Ex 
USSR 
Middle 
East* 
East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Age: 15-29 26.66 23.42 30.45 17.19 15.59 12.59 15.91 16.43 
Age 30-49 26.33 23.72 28.29 16.68 16.05 15.96 16.80 17.81 
Age: 50+ 23.49 24.74 26.02 17.85 16.70 17.06 17.85 16.05 
 
* In Middle East countries, the variable focussing on ecological taxes is lacking, because it was not part of the 
survey 
 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
While corroborating many empirical regularities known from extensive earlier studies, our 
findings offer many hitherto unknown insights that invite new theoretical interpretations and 
speculations. 
First of all, political thinking in terms of "left and "right" is a phenomenon that has success-
fully expanded from its originating Western European context all over the globe. In all re-
gions except the Middle East, at least 60 percent of the total population (and over eighty 
percent of politically interested respondents) are ready to place themselves on a respective 
LR-scale. This conforms with the notion that on a global scale, Islamism represents the only 
salient alternative to Western political culture. Most remarkably, East Asian countries have 
internalized left-right thinking to a higher degree than post-socialist countries - despite their 
larger geographical and cultural distance from the Western world. Especially the ex-USSR 
countries seem to be still affected by communist (better: Stalinist) ideology (which shares 
with Islamism a tendency to blend leftist elements of egalitarianism with "fascist" rightist ex-
tremist features.  
Secondly, in all regions, left-right self identifications are particularly widespread among the 
more educated and the more politically active strata: an indicator that they are highly central, 
institutionalized features of the respective political systems. Even Muslim populations follow 
neatly this trend: illustrating the degree to which alternative Islamist notions are more salient 
among lower endogenous strata than among the elites. 
Third, irrespective of region, LR self placements are moderately more prevalent among male 
and urban respondents and among populations of richer countries, while age and income 
levels are less consequential. However, very significant regional divergences cannot be ex-
plained neither by different micro-characteristics on the level of respondents nor by the de-
gree of macroeconomic development. Thus, they are likely to emerge from differences in 
endogenous political culture. 
 Fourth, the populations of different regions deviate considerably in their frequency distribu-
tion across the LR scale. While continental European populations are heavily skewed toward 
the left and East Asian countries toward the right, the remaining regions show more equili-
brated patterns. Of course, such discrepancies are hard to interpret as long as left-right 
scale is not internationally calibrated. 
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Fifth, in all regions, the politically more interested and more active strata are much more 
likely to associate their LR-placements with particular political issue positions. Among highly 
educated Western elites, more than 30% of the variance in scale placements can be ex-
plained on the basis of eight issues and individual religiosity. 
 
Sixth, opinions on "materialist as well as "post materialist" issues are likewise associated 
with LR self placements in all regions. However, there are many discrepancies that reflect 
the varying political cultures and political problem agendas of different regions. As expected, 
items related to environmental protection and "job protectionism" is more salient in higher 
developed countries, religiosity and the abortion issue seem to be universally decisive. 
Seventh, In conformity with previous, studies, it was found that issue positions are better in 
predicting LR values on the left half of the scale, while differences between moderate and 
extreme rightist positions cannot be grasped well with the indicators at hand. However, this 
regularity is not valid in East Asia where the right scale section is more highly associated 
with specific political stances. 
Eight, the inclination to relate concrete issues "vertically" to the LR dimension is largely par-
alleled by the tendency to relate these same issues "horizontally" to clusters along a LR axis 
that can be assessed by factor analytic procedures. In all regions except the Middle East, 
politically active strata cluster their opinions on a first major axis that absorbs from 15 to 25% 
of he covariance existing among the nine items. 
Ninth, higher educated strata show higher "vertical" as well as "horizontal" couplings in An-
glo-Saxon and Western European countries, while no differences are found in the other re-
gions. As a consequence, highly educated strata show more interregional variance in their 
degree of ideology than population with less schooling. This result evidently contradicts the 
widespread theoretical notion that educated strata are more likely to adopt a homogeneous 
Westernized culture all over the world. 
Tenth, neither vertical nor horizontal ideological clustering is significantly influenced by gen-
der or age. This accord with the hypothesis that at least within politically more informed 
strata, left right thinking is an ubiquitous (and since decades unchanging) constituent of po-
litical culture. 
 
Of course, many of the reported findings can be questioned by taking into account the par-
ticular methodological premises and limitations on which this study has relied. 
 
1) The obtrusive regularity that the WVS indicators were most potent in explaining LR self 
placements within highly educated Western populations may be an artefact: caused by the 
fact that exactly these strata have designed the questionnaire. In future studies, it will be 
important to include issues more akin to the political agenda of uneducated populations and 
non-western countries. We may well find that correlations between issue positions and self 
placements are quite similar everywhere when the issues most salient to the respective 
populations are included. 
 
2) Instead of starting with geographical regions defined ex ante, we may use cluster analysis 
in order to assess inductively how nations (or even sub national regions) group themselves 
in terms issue opinion patterns and ideological culture. In addition, it has to be explored how 
such transnational clusterings different when different national subpopulations (e. g. accord-
ing to education, age or ethnicity) are considered. 
 
3) While cross sectional studies provide some preliminary insights into historical dynamics 
(e. g. by comparing age cohorts), longitudinal studies are indispensable for assessing the 
speed, scope and deepness of ideological change. 
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